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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper studies the effect of reductions in the amount of executive compensation expense that 
corporations could deduct after passage of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TJCA) on capital 
structure. Research has examined whether other provisions in the TJCA lead to decreased 
corporate leverage, but this research has not considered the potentially large non-debt tax shield 
provided by executive compensation. I predict and find some evidence that firms with relatively 
larger amounts of executive compensation will experience either increases or smaller decreases in 
leverage due to expanded executive compensation related debt capacity after the passage of TJCA. 
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Introduction 
 This research examines whether the restrictions in tax deductibility of executive stock 
compensation due to the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) impacted corporate debt structure. 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) suggest that the tax benefits of debt increase firm value and decrease 
the cost of using debt capital. However, in the presence of non-debt tax shields, the tax benefit of 
debt is reduced (Trezevant, 1992).  Prior research has found that tax deductions from stock options 
can be a significant non-debt tax shield that reduces the attractiveness of debt relative to other 
forms of financing (Graham, Lang, and Shackelford, 2004). Because the TJCA reduced the tax 
benefit from executive stock options, it reduced a potentially significant non-debt tax shield that 
could increase the relative attractiveness of debt financing for the most impacted firms.  
The intent behind the TCJA that limited the deduction for publicly traded corporations 
specifically targeted executive remuneration in excess of $1 million. Congress enacted this change 
in tax policy in response to the exponential increase in executive compensation that occurred in 
recent decades. Policymakers believed that executive compensation, particularly for “covered 
employees,” had reached excessive levels. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) published guidance 
on interpretation of the TCJA law that defined “covered employees” as an individual who served 
as either the Principal Executive Officer (PEO) or the Principal Financial Officer (PFO) at any 
point during the fiscal year in addition to the three highest compensated employees besides these 
two officers.1 While Congressional reports indicate a key objective of this provision was to shift 
the mix of executive compensation away from stock options to create a greater focus on longer-
term company performance, the initial evidence in DeSimone, McClure, and Stomberg (2019) 
suggests firms did not alter their compensation structure after the passage of TJCA. Because 
 
1 Moreover, the new law also applies to any individual who previously qualified as a “covered employee,” whether 
they fit the definition during the current year or not. 
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executive compensation remained largely consistent before and after the TJCA, I can better isolate 
the impact of lost non-debt tax shields on firms’ capital structure decisions   
 The TJCA transformed the corporate landscape in the U.S. and lead to a number of other 
significant changes to the corporate tax code (Carrizosa, Gaertner, and Lynch, 2019) including 
reducing the corporate tax rate, removing the deferral provision for income earned overseas, and 
limiting the deductibility of interest expense. While research has also examined the impact of the 
TJCA on executive compensation structure and mix (Luna, Schuchard, and Stanley, 2019; 
DeSimone et al., 2019) to my knowledge no study has examined how the TJCA impacted the non-
debt tax shield from executive stock options. Carrizosa et al. (2019) finds that on average, firms 
most likely to be impacted by the interest limitations enacted by the TJCA reduced leverage, while 
firms less likely to be impacted increased leverage. However, Carrisoza et al. (2019) does not 
consider the reduction in non-debt tax shields from the TJCA’s executive compensation 
provisions. Consequently, it could be the case that the likelihood a firm is constrained by the 
interest deduction limitation is different after adding back the lost deduction from executive 
compensation to estimates of adjusted taxable income in Carrisoza et al. (2019).    
For my empirical tests, I begin by accessing financial information for a random sample of 
twenty S&P 100 firms and twenty NASDAQ 100  firms before and after the TJCA (i.e. for fiscal 
years 2016 and 2018).2 With this sample, I replicate descriptive analysis in Graham et al. (2004) 
by summarizing firm size, equity risk, leverage, the tax benefits from stock options, as well as 
other firm attributes. Consistent with the executive compensation provisions of the TJCA I find 
that, on average, the tax benefit from stock compensation as reported by the firms in my sample 
decreased from 2016 to 2018.   
 
2 My sample companies are listed in Appendix 2.  
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In subsequent analysis, I focus on differences between firms more or less likely to 
experience increased debt capacity due to lost executive compensation related deductions. For 
initial univariate tests, I partition my sample into NASDAQ 100 and S&P 100 firms because, prior 
to TJCA, stock option deductions tended to be more important in lowering firms’ marginal tax 
rates for NASDAQ 100 firms than for S&P 100 firms (Graham et al., 2004). For subsequent 
univariate and multivariate tests, I access firms’ Schedule 14A filings to estimate the magnitude 
of executive stock option deductions, absent any limitations, and scale this estimate by pretax book 
income consistent with Graham et al. (2004). Because this measure increases in forgone executive 
compensation deductions, I predict that it will be associated with increases in firms’ debt capacity 
after TCJA.  
My initial univariate correlation analysis provides some evidence that changes in capital 
structure are more highly correlated with my proxy for increased debt capacity for NASDAQ 100 
firms than for S&P 100 firms, consistent with forgone stock option deductions freeing up more 
debt capacity for NASDAQ 100 firms. In an additional univariate analysis, I follow Carrizosa et 
al. (2019) to identify the firms more likely to be close to their interest limitation as enacted by the 
TCJA. Firms at their interest limitation would be less likely to increase debt even when my 
measure for increased debt capacity is higher. I find that firms likely to be at their interest limit 
have the lowest, and often negative, changes in debt subsequent to TJCA. Within the set of firms 
not at their interest limit, I find inconsistent evidence that increased debt capacity is related to 
larger increases in debt. To better control for the impact of correlated omitted variables on the 
relation between increased debt capacity from forgone executive stock option deductions and 
increases in debt, in my final set of analysis, I perform multivariate regressions. Specifically, I 
regress changes in total debt, both in percentage terms and relative to assets, on my measure of 
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increased debt capacity and a set of controls consistent with Carrizosa et al. (2019). I find some 
evidence that my variable of interest, 2018 Stock Option Deductions divided by Pretax Income 
(Debt_Capacity), is associated with increases in debt.  I provide more detail below on my sample, 
tests, and conclusions.  
 
Data and Measurements 
 
 I begin with a sample of twenty randomly selected firms from the current S&P 100 and 
twenty randomly selected firms from the current NASDAQ 100. I then access financial data for 
each company from the respective 2016 and 2018 annual 10-K reports. These figures include total 
assets, common equity at year end to calculate market value, net income to calculate return on 
assets, income before income taxes, total debt, and total stock-based compensation tax benefit. 
These numbers are typically presented in the financial statements.  The stock-based compensation 
tax benefit is typically found within the Notes to the Financial Statements related to Stock-Based 
Compensation. Using this information, I calculate the return on assets and the tax benefit related 
to stock-based compensation divided by pretax income. Next, I use Yahoo Finance to add the stock 
ticker and market value of the companies at the 2016 and 2018 year ends. I calculate market value 
by multiplying total share volume by the adjusted closing price. Further, I present the debt to value 
ratio as a percentage by dividing total debt by market value.  
Because my descriptive analysis requires historic equity betas, I access firms’ historical 
daily stock prices to calculate historical daily returns (i.e. (Pricenew / Priceold) – 1). I access data for 
the historical returns to S&P 500 index to serve as the source of the market return for the single 
factor beta model estimation. Finally, I access data from the Fama-French website for daily risk-
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free rates. 3 With this information, I calculate the excess market return and excess return for each 
company by subtracting the risk-free rate from the daily stock and market return. My final equity 
beta estimate is derived from an ordinary least-squares regression of excess daily stock returns on 
excess market returns, where the coefficient of market excess returns represents the equity beta 
estimate.  
 Because the change in deductibility of compensation subsequent to TCJA of 2017 targeted 
executives deemed to be “covered employees,” I collect data related to executive compensation. 
Doing so helps me to estimate the portion of firms’ total tax benefit from equity compensation 
correspondent to compensation of the top four to seven executives (i.e. all covered employees). 
For completeness, this portion of my analysis includes any executive listed in the firms’ DEF 14A 
filings. These filings are found by searching the SEC EDGAR website using each sample firms’ 
ticker symbol. From the DEF 14A, I compiled the value of exercised stock grants and exercised 
stock option awards for 2016 and 2018 fiscal years. Tax law suggests that unless executives elect 
to have stock grants taxable at the time of grant, before TCJA firms would receive a tax deduction 
equal to the fair value of the stock upon grant vesting. Estimating the tax deduction from exercised 
options is not as straight forward, as firms receive tax deductions equal to the difference between 
the option strike price and stock price at the date of exercise.  Information on stock option exercises 
are typically summarized in the Options Exercised and Stock Vested Table. From this table, I 
collect the value realized on exercise as well as the number of shares exercised for each of the 
executives also listed in the Summary Executive Compensation Table. Using these two inputs, I 
estimate the tax deduction related to stock options with the following formula:  
 
 
3 I divide the daily risk-free rates by one hundred in order to convert the imported percentages to a decimal to be 
consistent with other data. 
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Stock Options Deduction = Value Realized on Exercise – (Weighted Average Exercise 
Price * Number of Shares Exercised) 
 
Because the DEF 14A filing does not contain the weighted average exercise price, I searched the 
10-K Annual Report for the respective fiscal year to find the weighted average exercise price.   
In a few instances (i.e. Pfizer, Walmart, Verisign, PepsiCo, AT&T, Duke Energy, and Mondelez 
International) the weighted average exercise price for stock options is not available. Therefore, I 
estimate the weighted average exercise price by using each firms’ average vesting period. If this 
information could not be found in the 10-K or DEF 14A filings, I use four years as a vesting period, 
as this represents the average vesting period for stock options of all publicly traded companies. 
Because stock option strike prices are typically equal to stock value upon grant, knowing the 
vesting period provides an estimate of the date stock options were granted and an estimate of the 
strike price. I use the estimated vesting period to estimate grant year and then use the average of 
the stock price in the grant year as my estimate of option strike price as follows: 
 
Weighted Average Exercise Price = (Beginning Stock Price + Ending Stock Price) / 2 
 
 
In some cases, my assumptions yield a negative tax deduction value because estimated strike price  
exceeds stock value upon exercise. Because executives would not exercise underwater options, I 
set negative realizations to zero. The total tax benefit from executive compensation is the sum of 
the benefit from stock option exercises and stock grant vesting.  Because this measure increases in 
forgone executive compensation deductions, I predict that it will be associated with increases in 
firms’ debt capacity after TCJA.  
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Descriptive Analysis 
 
 I summarize my data that includes many of the variables examined in Graham et al. (2004) 
in Table 1. I present mean, median, standard deviation, twenty-fifth percentile, and seventy-fifth 
percentile realizations using various sample sorts. First in Panel A, I summarize this data for the 
full sample of forty firms from both S&P 100 and NASDAQ 100 firms presenting their 2016 and 
2018 data as Panel A. Second in Panel B (Panel C), I present 2016 (2018) summary statistics for 
each subsample of twenty firms, separating S&P 100 firms and NASDAQ 100 firms.  For the sake 
of my research question, I also include the data for the total stock option tax deductions as well as 
stock option deductions divided by pretax income. Appendix 1 defines these variables for more 
detail.  
The results of summarizing these statistics suggest that all forty firms have an approximate 
average 2018 Stock Option Deductions equal to 2.55% of Pretax Book Income but that this 
measure is unequal for S&P 100 firms versus NASDAQ 100 firms. S&P 100 firms have an average 
2018 Stock Option Deductions equal to 1.02% of Pretax Book Income, while NASDAQ 100 firms 
have an average 2018 Stock Option Deductions equal to 4.09% of Pretax Book Income. This 
measure corresponds to the independent variable Debt_Capacity later used in my regression 
analysis. The larger percentage of Pretax Income for NASDAQ 100 firms is consistent with 
Graham et al (2004) that marginal tax rates, and thus the 2017 Tax Cuts & Jobs Act, affect 
NASDAQ 100 firms to a greater degree. 
 Table 2 presents the results for a correlation analysis that tests whether change in debt is 
associated with the magnitude of stock option deductions and if this correlation differs depending 
on whether the firm is from the S&P 100 or NASDAQ 100. Specifically, I estimate the correlation 
coefficient between 2018 Stock Option Deductions divided by Pretax Income – my proxy for 
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increased debt capacity following TCJA – with two variables designed to capture changes in firms’ 
total debt: Percent Change in Total Debt and Change in Total Debt Scaled by Total Assets.  
Based on the work of Graham et al (2004) that demonstrates stock option deductions are 
more meaningful for NASDAQ 100 firms, my correlation results concur with this claim, as 
indicated by the correlation coefficients and the significance of P-values. For NASDAQ 100 firms, 
both correlations between Debt_Capacity and the Percent Change in Debt as well as the Change 
in Total Debt Scaled by Total Assets are positive, while the correlation coefficients between 
Debt_Capacity and the two change in debt measures for S&P 100 firms are negative. This presents 
evidence that changes in capital structure are more highly correlated with my proxy for increased 
debt capacity for NASDAQ 100 firms than for S&P 500 firms, as the findings in Graham et al. 
(2004) would predict. I also find evidence that the difference in correlation coefficients is 
statistically significant, as indicated by a P-value of 0.020 for my Z-score, when I measure the 
change in debt using percentages instead of scaled values.   
Table 3 presents two partitioned analyses of means using the full sample of forty firms. I 
first separate the data between 2016 and 2018 collection, then I find the mean Total Debt Scaled 
by Total Assets of all firms below the median of their corresponding Debt_Capacity. 
Debt_Capacity represents 2018 Stock Option Deductions divided by 2018 Pretax Book Income. I 
repeat this test but find the mean Total Debt Scaled by Total Assets of all firms above the median 
of their corresponding Debt_Capacity. I perform this test using the 2016 data then again using the 
2018 data. Next, I use the 2018 data separated by an Interest Limit equal to one versus Interest 
Limit equal to zero for two additional analyses of means for my dependent variables of interest. I 
calculate the mean Change in Total Debt Scaled by Total Assets of the twenty firms below the 
median Debt_Capacity, then I calculate the mean Change in Total Debt Scaled by Total Assets of 
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the twenty firms above the median Debt_Capacity. Lastly, I calculate the mean Percent Change in 
Total Debt of the twenty firms below the median Debt_Capacity, then I calculate the mean Percent 
Change in Total Debt of the twenty firms above the median Debt_Capacity.  
 The results in Table 3 suggest that for most firms with an Interest Limit equal to one, debt 
decreases from 2016 to 2018, which is expected. This occurs in both samples above and below the 
median Debt_Capacity for the mean Change in Total Debt Scaled by Total Assets and in the 
sample above the median Debt_Capacity for the Percent Change in Total Debt. The mean change 
in debt measures for the samples above the median Debt_Capacity decrease to a lesser degree. 
This is most likely due to these firms having higher 2018 Stock Option Deductions, suggesting 
that they have a small increase in debt capacity due to no longer being able to deduct the stock-
based compensation. Moreover, considering the firms whose Interest Limit equals zero, all four 
subsamples show a mean increase in debt, both as measured by Change in Total Debt Scaled by 
Total Assets and Percent Change in Total Debt. We would expect the firms with a higher 
Debt_Capacity to have a greater degree of increase in debt from 2016 to 2018, which is the case 
for Percent Change in Total Debt. However, when scaled by Total Assets, the change in Total Debt 
is less severe for firms with the higher 2018 Stock Option Deductions divided by Pretax Income.  
 
Regression Analysis 
 To control for other correlated variables that are not related to debt capacity but could 
impact changes in leverage for my sample of firms, I also perform multivariate regression analysis. 
Specifically, I use the following ordinary least squares regression model:  
∆Leverage = 0 + 1Debt_Capacity + 2∆ROA + 3∆SIZE + 4∆BTM + 5TANG + 6IntLim 
+ 7Debt_Capacity*IntLim 
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Debt_Capacity is my independent variable of interest and is measured as 2018 Stock 
Option Deductions as a percent of 2018 Pretax Book Income. Because I predict increased debt 
capacity from forgone stock option deductions should be positively associated with increases in 
debt, I predict that 1 > 0. The dependent variable in my regression model, ∆Leverage, is the 
change in leverage, defined as either ∆LEV/SIZE or ∆%LEV. ∆LEV/SIZE is measured as the raw 
Change in Total Debt Scaled by Total Assets from 2016 to 2018. ∆%LEV is measured as the 
Percent Change in Total Debt from 2016 to 2018. Additional control variables are ∆ROA, ∆SIZE, 
∆BTM, and ∆TANG. ∆ROA is the change in Return on Assets, measured as 2018 net income as a 
percent of 2018 total assets minus 2016 net income as a percent of 2016 total assets. ∆SIZE is 
measured as the natural log of 2018 total assets minus the natural log of 2016 total assets. ∆BTM 
is measured as the change in the Book-to-Market Value from 2016 to 2018, calculated as 2018 
book value of equity divided by share price at year end multiplied by the number of shares of 
common stock outstanding in 2018 minus 2016 book value of equity divided by share price at year 
end multiplied by the number of shares of common stock outstanding in 2016. The fourth control 
variable, ∆TANG, is measured as 2018 property, plant, and equipment (PPE) net of accumulated 
depreciation scaled by 2018 total assets minus 2016 property, plant, and equipment net of 
accumulated depreciation scaled by 2016 total assets. 
I perform regressions with and without the inclusion of IntLim and the interaction between 
IntLim and Debt_Capacity. IntLim represents a binary measure equal to one if interest expense for 
the corresponding firm is greater than thirty percent of the sum of pretax income, interest expense 
and accumulated depreciation less interest income. If interest expense is less than or equal to thirty 
percent of the sum of pretax income, interest expense and accumulated depreciation less interest 
income, then IntLim equals zero. I include IntLim and its interaction with Debt_Capacity in my 
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regression analysis based on the same variables used in the regression analysis presented by 
Carrisoza et al. (2019). Based on my hypothesis that increased debt capacity will not hold 
significance for firms that are already at the interest limit, I predict the coefficient on 
Debt_Capacity 1 > 0, and the coefficient for the interaction between Debt_Capacity and IntLim 
7 < 0.  
I find some evidence in my regression analysis supporting my prediction. Consistent with 
my prediction, the coefficient on Debt_Capacity is positive across all regressions. However, it is 
only statistically significant in the regressions where the percent change in debt is my dependent 
variable (∆%LEV).  
 
Conclusion 
 My paper examines whether the restrictions in tax deductibility of executive stock 
compensation due to the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) impacted corporate debt structure. 
Through statistical analysis, I find some evidence to support the hypothesis that firms with a 
higher debt capacity due to reduced stock option deductions in 2018 see a greater increase or 
lower decrease in debt from periods just prior to just after TJCA. This evidence is based 
univariate analysis of differences in means and multivariate regression analysis. Further in 
univariate correlation analysis, I find that that my hypothesis holds for NASDAQ 100 firms but 
does not hold for S&P 100 firms which is consistent with NASDAQ 100 firms being more 
impacted by the reductions in executive compensation and hence are likely to experience greater 
increase in debt capacity. My paper adds to the research on the impacts of TJCA, and particularly 
its impact on capital structure.  
 
12 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Carrizosa, Richard D.; Gaertner, Fabio B. & Lynch, Daniel P. May 2019. Debt and Taxes? The 
Effect of TCJA Interest Limitations on Capital Structure. 
 
DeSimone, Lisa; McClure, Charles & Stomberg, Bridget. 17 June 2019. Examining the Immediate 
Effects of Recent Tax Law Changes on the Structure of Executive Compensation. Kelley 
School of Business Research Paper No. 19-28. 
 
Graham, John R.; Lang, Mark H. & Shackelford, Douglas A. 2004. Employee Stock 
Options, Corporate Taxes, and Debt Policy. The Journal of Finance Vol. 59, Issue 4.  
 
Luna, LeAnn; Schuchard, Kathleen & Stanley, Danielle. 19 September 2019. Changes in CEO 
Compensation after the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act and the Impact of Corporate Governance: 
Initial Evidence. 
 
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. 1963. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A 
Correction. American Economic Review Vol. 53, Issue 3:443–53. 
 
Trezevant, Robert. September 1992. Debt Financing and Tax Status: Tests of the Substitution 
Effect and the Tax Exhaustion Hypothesis Using Firms' Responses to the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The Journal of Finance Vol. 47, Issue 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
APPENDIX 1 
Variable Definitions 
 
Assets ($M)= Total current and non-current assets, in millions 
Stock Option 
Deductions ($M)= 
Total tax benefit related to employee stock options; value realized on 
exercise - (weighted average exercise price * number of shares 
exercised) 
Pretax Income 
($M)= 
Earnings before income tax expense, in millions 
Equity Beta= Measure of fluctuation with the market; result of regressing daily 
returns for each individual firm against market returns 
∆ROA= Change in return on assets; (2018 pretax income / 2018 total assets) - 
(2016 pretax income / 2016 total assets) 
 
∆SIZE= Change in size; ln (2018 total assets) - ln (2016 total assets) 
∆BTM= Change in Book-to-Market value; (2018 book value of equity / share 
price at 12/31/18 * common stock outstanding 2018) - (2016 book 
value of equity / share price at 12/31/16 * common stock outstanding 
2016) 
∆TANG= Change in tangibility; (2018 PPE, net / 2018 total assets) - (2018 PPE, 
net / 2018 total assets) 
IntLim= 1 if interest expense > 30% *(pretax income + interest expense + 
accumulated depreciation - interest income) 
∆(LEV/SIZE)= Change in leverage scaled by assets from 2016 to 2018; (2018 total 
debt / 2018 total assets) – (2016 total debt / 2018 total assets) 
%∆LEV= Percent change in leverage from 2016 to 2018; (2018 total debt – 2016 
total debt) / 2016 total debt 
Debt_Capacity= 2018 Stock options deductions / 2018 pretax income 
PPE, net= Property, plant and equipment net of accumulated depreciation 
Market Equity= Share price at year end * weighted average common stock outstanding 
Debt / Value= Leverage scaled by market value; total debt / (share price at year end * 
common stock outstanding) 
Change in Raw 
Total Debt= 
Raw change in leverage from 2016 to 2018; 2018 total debt – 2016 
total debt 
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APPENDIX 2 
Sample Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S&P 100  NASDAQ 100  
American Express  Microsoft Corporation 
Boeing Co.  Autodesk, Inc. 
Colgate Palmolive  Apple Inc 
The Walt Disney Company  Fox Corporation 
Duke Energy Corporation  Hasbro, Inc. 
FedEx Corporation  Amazon.com Inc. 
Home Depot  Netflix 
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.  Modelez International 
The Coca Cola Company  PepsiCo, Inc. 
JPMorgan Chase & Co.  Starbucks Corporation 
3M Company  Texas Instruments, Inc. 
Nike, Inc.  Ulta Beauty 
Pfizer Inc  Tesla, Inc. 
Southern Company  Workday, Inc. 
Target Corporation  Facebook Inc 
AT&T Inc  VeriSign 
United Parcel Service  O’Reilly Automotive, Inc. 
Visa Inc.  Microchip Technology 
Walmart Inc.  Fastenal Company 
Exxon Mobil Corp.  Costco Wholesale Corporation 
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TABLE 1 – PANEL A 
Summary Statistics – Pooled Sample by Year 
 
2016 Obs. Mean Median Std Dev 25% 75% 
Asset ($M) 40 157,660 44,530 409,482 13,221 115,463 
Market Equity ($M) 40 35,010 12,295 53,883 2,097 42,612 
Return on Assets (%) 40 10.21% 8.55% 9.68% 3.38% 15.44% 
Debt/Value (%) 40 97.09% 104.30% 36.40% 70.25% 119.60% 
Stock Option Deductions ($M) 40 211 77 392 27 190 
Pretax Income ($M) 40 7865 4411 11104 1286 8402 
Deductions / Pretax Income (%) 40 22.95% 1.25% 128.86% 0.85% 2.97% 
Interest Limit (%) 40 5.00% 0.00% 22.07% 0.00% 0.00% 
Equity Beta 40 0.97 1.04 0.36 0.70 1.20 
       
2018 Obs. Mean Median Std Dev 25% 75% 
Asset ($M) 40 178,276 53,081 433,089 21,186 148,900 
Market Equity ($M) 40 43,179 13,811 73,879 2,217 46,071 
Return on Assets (%) 40 10.78% 8.01% 8.25% 4.54% 16.16% 
Debt/Value (%) 40 96.89% 96.50% 38.85% 69.58% 126.75% 
Stock Option Deductions ($M) 40 172 61 342 33 125 
Pretax Income ($M) 40 10,494 5,277 14,237 1,583 12,562 
Deductions / Pretax Income (%) 40 2.55% 0.79% 5.14% 0.49% 2.63% 
Interest Limit (%) 40 12.50% 0.00% 33.49% 0.00% 0.00% 
Equity Beta 40 0.97 0.97 0.39 0.70 1.27 
 
 
TABLE 1 – PANEL B 
Summary Statistics – 2016 NASDAQ 100  vs. S&P 100 Firms 
 
S&P 100 Obs. Mean Median  Std Dev  25% 75% 
Asset ($M) 20  267,172   89,652   559,254   39,641   178,607  
Market Equity ($M) 20  51,354   24,916   66,043   10,801   65,783  
Return on Assets (%) 20 10.16% 7.40% 12.05% 3.11% 11.97% 
Debt/Value ($M) 20  365   174   513   72   480  
Stock Option Deductions ($M) 20  168   89   203   45   232  
Pretax Income ($M) 20  9,385   7,991   7,453   4,459   10,851  
Deductions / Pretax Income (%) 20 1.71% 1.09% 1.49% 0.97% 2.22% 
Equity Beta 20  0.84   0.82   0.35   0.63   1.09  
 
NASDAQ 100  Obs. Mean Median  Std Dev  25% 75% 
Asset ($M) 20 48,148 15,381 78,508 5,409 62,340 
Market Equity ($M) 20 18,666 5,322 32,181 1,804 13,758 
Return on Assets (%) 20 10.26% 9.57% 6.86% 5.22% 15.81% 
Debt/Value ($M) 20 57 35 57 19 82 
Stock Option Deductions ($M) 20 203 22 388 7 130 
Pretax Income ($M) 20 6,345 1,117 13,881 519 4,382 
Deductions / Pretax Income (%) 20 44.19% 2.36% 182.02% 0.63% 4.22% 
Equity Beta 20 1.11 1.10 0.33 0.99 1.23 
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TABLE 1 – PANEL C 
Summary Statistics – 2018 NASDAQ 100 vs. S&P 100 Firms 
 
S&P 100 Obs. Mean Median  Std Dev  25% 75% 
Asset ($M) 20 293,744 107,756 589,683 48,513 192,881 
Market Equity ($M) 20 65,102 25,665 95,626 9,839 11,138 
Return on Assets (%) 20 8.41% 7.42% 6.43% 3.73% 10.38% 
Debt/Value ($M) 20 287 119 452 76 202 
Stock Option Deductions ($M) 20 126 59 237 23 139 
Pretax Income ($M) 20 11,946 9,977 10,078 4,346 14,599 
Deductions / Pretax Income (%) 20 1.02% 0.70% 0.98% 0.38% 1.15% 
Equity Beta 20 0.84 0.86 0.33 0.69 1.08 
 
NASDAQ 100 Obs. Mean Median  Std Dev  25% 75% 
Asset ($M) 20 62,808 25,065 95,967 5,457 66,459 
Market Equity ($M) 20 21,255 5,081 32,362 1,804 22,027 
Return on Assets (%) 20 13.14% 11.04% 9.31% 5.22% 19.19% 
Debt/Value ($M) 20 57 38 91 11 49 
Stock Option Deductions ($M) 20 246 38 483 7 182 
Pretax Income ($M) 20 9,042 2,268 17,607 829 6,007 
Deductions / Pretax Income (%) 20 4.09% 1.45% 6.95% 0.53% 3.07% 
Equity Beta 20 1.10 1.14 0.41 0.76 1.39 
 
 
Table 1 presents the summarized statistics pulled from my sample of forty firms’ annual reports and other 
filings. Panel A summarizes all forty companies separated by the years 2016 and 2018. Panel B separates S&P 
100 firms from NASDAQ 100 firms for the year 2016. Panel C separates S&P 100 firms from NASDAQ 100 
firms for the year 2018. 
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TABLE 2  
Univariate Tests - Correlations  
 
 
 
NASDAQ 100  S&P 100 Tests for Differences in 
Correlations 
 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
P-value Correlation 
Coefficient 
P-value Z-Score P-value 
Change in Total Debt / Total Assets 
& 2018 Deductions / Pretax Income 0.106 0.100 -0.103 0.159 0.61 
 
0.542 
 
Percent Change in Total Debt &  
2018 Deductions / Pretax Income 0.586 0.007 -0.128 0.127 2.33 
 
 
0.020 
 
 
Table 2 presents the results of correlations as a univariate test. First, I present correlations separately on the twenty 
S&P 100 firms and the twenty NASDAQ 100 firms, and then I present the same correlations using the sample of 
all forty firms.
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TABLE 3 
Univariate Tests – Analysis of Means 
 
    
Change in Total Debt / Total Assets Obs. IntLim = 0 IntLim = 1 
Below Median Debt_Capacity 20 0.2210 -0.1947 
Above Median Debt_Capacity 20 0.1811 -0.0723 
    
Percent Change Total Debt Obs. IntLim = 0 IntLim = 1 
Below Median Debt_Capacity 20 0.3705 0.0813 
Above Median Debt_Capacity 20 0.5794 -0.0141 
 
 
Table 3 presents the results of a univariate test through analysis of means for the 
sample of forty firms. I separate my sample by interest limit of zero and interest limit 
of one. I show the means of my two dependent variables, Change in Total Debt Scaled 
by Total Assets and Percent Change in Total Debt, separated as below median 2018 
Stock Option Deductions divided by Pretax Income and above median 2018 Stock 
Option Deductions divided by Pretax Income.  
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TABLE 4 
Regression Sample Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std Dev 25% 75% 
2018 Deductions / Pretax Income 40 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.03 
Change in Total Debt / Total Assets 40 0.188 0.088 0.893 -0.036 0.230 
Change in Total Debt (%) 40 45.31% 23.83% 106.68% -0.81% 44.37% 
Change in ROA 40 0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.00 0.04 
Change in Size 40 0.22 0.10 0.44 0.045 0.24 
Change in Book-to-Market (BTM) 40 3.45 0.00 17.28 -0.13 0.22 
Change in Tangibility 40 -0.01 -0.00 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 
2018 Interest Limit 40 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Table 4 presents the summarized statistics pulled from my sample of forty firms’ annual reports 
and other filings. It summarizes all forty firm changes from 2016 to 2018 in addition to the 2018 
Stock Option Deductions divided by Pretax Income. These changes are used as the control 
variables as well as the dependent variables for my regression analysis using the 2018 Stock Option 
Deductions divided by Pretax Income as the independent variable in question. 
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TABLE 5 
Regression Analysis 
 
Panel A – Dependent variable = Change in total debt/assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B – Dependent variable = Percent change in total debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ∆(LEV/ASSETS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.173 0.309 0.358 0.358 
 (0.287) (0.164) (0.136) (0.142) 
Debt_Capacity 0.622 2.209 2.234 2.294 
 (0.826) (0.533) (0.533) (0.530) 
∆ROA  -1.245 -1.632 -1.669 
  (0.738) (0.669) (0.667) 
∆SIZE  -0.572 -0.638 -0.647 
  (0.417) (0.377) (0.379) 
∆BTM  0.006 0.007 0.007 
  (0.464) (0.410) (0.425) 
∆TANG  1.878 2.166 2.168 
  (0.612) (0.566) (0.571) 
Int_Limit   -0.344 -0.268 
   (0.558) (0.724) 
Debt_Capacity*Int_Limit    -7.469 
    (0.872) 
     
R2 0.001 0.066 0.075 0.076 
Nobs 40 40 40 40 
 ∆%LEV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.263 0.279 0.323 0.324 
 (0.149) (0.270) (0.238) (0.244) 
Debt_Capacity 7.448** 6.991* 7.014* 7.129* 
 (0.023) (0.091) (0.094) (0.095) 
∆ROA  -0.558 -0.907 -0.979 
  (0.896) (0.836) (0.826) 
∆SIZE  0.147 0.088 0.070 
  (0.855) (0.915) (0.934) 
∆BTM  0.005 0.006 0.006 
  (0.614) (0.563) (0.583) 
∆TANG  1.409 1.669 1.673 
  (0.739) (0.699) (0.702) 
Int_Limit   -0.311 -0.163 
   (0.644) (0.851) 
Debt_Capacity*Int_Limit    -14.581 
    (0.784) 
     
R2 0.129 0.142 0.148 0.150 
Nobs 40 40 40 40 
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TABLE 5 
Regression Analysis, continued… 
 
Table 5 presents the results of my regression analysis on the sample of forty firms. Panel A displays 
results for the first dependent variable, Change in Total Debt Scaled by Total Assets from 2016 to 
2018. Panel B shows results for the second dependent variable, Percent Change in Total Debt from 
2016 to 2018.  The coefficient is listed first with the P-value listed below in parentheses. One 
asterisk indicates a P-value greater than 0.05 but less than or equal to 0.10; two asterisks indicates 
a P-value greater than 0.01 but less than or equal to 0.05; and three asterisks indicates a P-value 
less than or equal to 0.01.  
 
